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Appraising Traditional and Purpose-Built Person Fit Statistics’ Power
to Detect Cheating
Sanford Student
University of Colorado Boulder

Abstract
Person-fit statistics (PFSs) have been suggested as a tool to detect cheating in
large-scale testing, and this study investigates their potential for this application.
Most PFSs are equally sensitive to scores that appear spuriously high or spuriously
low. Xia and Zheng introduced four PFSs that are meant to be more sensitive to
spuriously high scores and therefore may be more appropriate for detecting cheating.
Comparing the power of these weighted PFSs against the power of traditional PFSs
to detect cheating shows that there is no single best statistic in all or most scenarios,
and in most scenarios, most examinees flagged as cheating by person fit analysis did
not cheat. Implications for operational use of PFSs to detect cheating are discussed.

1

Introduction

Person-fit statistics (PFSs) are considered important for
detecting the presence of test takers whose response
patterns are aberrant relative to most examinees
(Karabatsos, 2003; Sinharay, 2017). PFSs generally
fall into two categories. Parametric PFSs depend upon the
results of calibrating a measurement model, typically an
Item Response Theory (IRT Embretson & Reise, 2000)
model. Nonparametric statistics do not use the results
of a measurement model, instead estimating a statistic
of interest directly from raw response data. An example
of a popular parametric fit statistic is lz (Drasgow et al.,
1985), which expresses the standardized log-likelihood
of a given respondent’s item response pattern relative to
estimated IRT parameters. A well-known nonparametric
PFS is H T (Sijtsma, 1986), which expresses the sum of
the covariances between a given examinee’s responses and
all other examinees’ responses, divided by the maximum
possible sum of those covariances (Linacre, 2012). The
interpretation of PFSs varies; lz is interpreted relative
to a standard normal distribution, with negative values
indicating person misfit and positive values indicating
overfit, while H T falls between -1 and 1, with lower values
indicating the deviance of an individual’s responses from
those of other respondents, but with no specific distribution
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from which to derive critical values.
No single PFS has achieved widespread adoption, and
there appears to be no consensus on which statistic is
best suited to the detection of aberrant response patterns,
or even whether the use of such statistics is appropriate
at all (Meijer & Tendeiro, 2012; Wainer, 2012). To
gain more clarity on which PFS(s) to use in the detection
of aberrant responses, Karabatsos (2003) used receiver
operating curves (ROCs) to compare the power of 36 PFSs
to detect aberrant responding in datasets simulating the
responses of examinees to test items. The datasets vary
by length, prevalence of aberrant responding, and nature
of aberrant responding. While Karabatsos found that the
nonparametric H T statistic (Sijtsma, 1986) was the most
powerful for detecting aberrance, Sinharay (2017) pointed
out methodological issues with the calculation of power
that skewed Karabatsos’s findings in favor H T . Sinharay
(2017) instead concludes that three other statistics–the
parametric lz (Drasgow et al., 1985) and ECI4z (Tatsuoka,
1984) statistics, and the nonparametric U3 (van der Flier,
1980)—are equally as powerful as H T for detecting
aberrant responses.
Both studies investigate PFSs’ power to detect aberrance
of two distinct natures: spuriously high scores and
spuriously low scores. An examinee’s score is spurious if it
is much higher or much lower than the score associated with
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that examinee’s “true” ability relative to the tested content.
Notably, this can never be observed outside of a simulation,
as true ability is always unknown in the real world,
irrespective of the measurement model applied (or not).
The studies in Karabatsos (2003) and Sinharay (2017) are
based upon simulations of a variety of hypothesized sources
of aberrance, only some of which produce spuriously high
scores. In the context of high-stakes standardized testing,
these scores are of greater interest than spuriously low
scores for security purposes. The possible use of PFSs in
high stakes standardized testing has been suggested in both
the person-fit literature (Sinharay, 2016a), albeit tentatively,
and with more enthusiasm in operational test security
handbooks (Olson & Fremer, 2013; Wollack & Fremer,
2013). In this context, it is not clear that general-purpose
PFSs are best suited to the task of identifying examinees
who have cheated.
Theoretically, a PFS that is more sensitive to spuriously
high scores than spuriously low scores may be better
suited to the detection of cheating, as it should flag more
respondents whose deviation from the expected response
pattern matches the assumption that cheating will produce
higher scores. To this end, the present study considers not
only the four PFSs outlined in Sinharay (2017), but also
four PFSs derived specifically for the purpose of detecting
scores that are spuriously high (Xia & Zheng, 2018). These
statistics are all members of the family of PFSs outlined
in Snijders (2001) to which lz and ECI4z also belong, as
they express a (standardized) weighted sum of the squared
residuals of a respondent’s observed item responses given
their estimated ability and the estimated item parameters.
Notably, lz , ECI4z and all other previously conceived PFSs
in this family use symmetric weighting functions, meaning
that whether a score appears spuriously high or spuriously
low, the same amount of overall deviance from the expected
response pattern will produce the same value for the
statistic. An asymmetric weighting function can produce a
statistic that will yield values indicating greater misfit for
response patterns that appear to produce spuriously high
scores than for response patterns that produce apparently
spuriously low ones. To this end, Xia and Zheng introduce
SHa (λ )∗ and SHb (β )∗ , two families of fit statistics that
more heavily weight correct responses to items that the
respondent had little chance of getting correct given the
IRT model parameters. Here, λ and β are parameters to
the two different statistics; in their study, Xia and Zheng
consider four total statistics, two from each family. These
are SHa (1/2)∗ , SHa (1)∗ , SHb (2)∗ and SHb (3)∗ . The

specifics of these statistics are available in the original
paper.
This study investigates the power of these
asymmetrically-weighted PFSs, as well as four traditional,
symmetrically-weighted PFSs, to detect cheating in
two parts. First, I replicate the simulations performed
in Sinharay (2017), then compare the overall average
power of the weighted PFSs to detect aberrant examinees
compared with the power of four traditional PFSs to do
so. These traditional PFSs are H T , lz∗ (Snijders, 2001),
U3 and ECI4∗z (Sinharay, 2016a)1 . The second set of
simulations is conceptually similar to the crossed design
used by Karabatsos (2003) and by Sinharay (2017), but
with several departures intended to bring the simulations
closer to realistic conditions that might be found on a
high-stakes test. These changes are outlined below, but
the most notable update is to simulate cheating alongside
other types of aberrant responses instead of in isolation.
This supports investigations into whether PFSs can detect
cheating specifically alongside other aberrant test-taking
behaviors, as cheating is of greater interest in a test security
context than these other types. Additionally, this study goes
beyond relative power to consider the prospect of using any
of the investigated statistics for operational test security
purposes. Here, the question is not which statistic is most
powerful, but rather: are the statistics “good enough” at
flagging cheaters? To investigate this question, I leverage
positive predictive value (PPV).
First, I review the notion of aberrant responding and
why cheating differs from other types of aberrant response
in the context of high-stakes standardized testing. Next,
I review the simulations performed in Karabatsos (2003)
and Sinharay (2017), as I both replicate them in this
study and base the new simulations in this study on their
work. After reviewing these simulations, I explain the new
simulations performed for this study, noting both how they
differ from Karabatsos’s and Sinharay’s, and why these
departures produce simulations more relevant to real-world
educational testing scenarios. Then, I briefly review the
methodology used to compare different PFSs’ power to
detect cheating and investigate how they might perform
in an operational setting. I report the results of both
sets of simulations, then a discussion section considers the
implications of these results for the use of PFSs in test
security programs.
1l∗
z

and ECI4∗z are asymptotically-corrected versions of the
corresponding statistics used in Sinharay’s investigation of PFSs’ power
to detect aberrance.
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2.1

Background
What Is Aberrant Responding?

On an exam, an aberrant response pattern is one that
produces a spuriously high or low score relative to a given
examinee’s true ability (Karabatsos, 2003). Essentially,
an aberrant response pattern results when the process by
which an examinee arrives at their item responses does not
rely upon that examinee’s ability, but the existence of such
response patterns in real data is always hypothetical, as true
ability is never known. Thus, investigating such response
patterns almost always requires simulation and a theory
about what aberrant responding looks like. Karabatsos
hypothesizes five sources of aberrant response patterns:
cheating, creative responding, random responding, lucky
guessing, and responding carelessly. Two of these sources,
cheating and lucky guessing, are expected to produce
spuriously high scores relative to examinees’ true ability.
In contrast, careless and creative responding would produce
spuriously low scores.
The implications of random
guessing hinge on students’ true ability: a student who
would typically struggle mightily on a given test might
achieve a spuriously high score by responding at random,
while a student of high ability would likely produce a
spuriously low score via the same strategy. This study
pays particular interest to cheating, which is more clearly
relevant to policymaking and test security than the other
sources of aberrance.
2.2

Why Is Detecting Cheating of Particular Interest?

36

The logic of leveraging PFSs as a security measure
implicitly relies on two assumptions. The first is that there
is some possibility, even a very small one, that test security
was unknowingly breached, allowing some examinees to
gain an advantage unrelated to their true ability to answer
the questions on the test. The second is that non-cheating
examinees will respond in line with the measurement model
used for scoring, so that departures from this model can
be considered evidence of possible cheating. However,
cheating is far from the only source of aberrant response
patterns on tests, even ones with very high stakes where all
examinees stand to benefit from high scores. The behaviors
modeled in Karabatsos (2003) are all plausible. However,
these other behaviors are not considered a test security
concern or a reason to invalidate examinees’ scores. If
person fit analysis is to be used in test security, the statistic
used should be able to differentiate between cheating
examinees and examinees whose responses are different
from those predicted by the measurement model, but not
indicative of a test security issue.

3
3.1

Methods
Replication: Karabatsos (2003)’s Simulations

The original source of the simulation strategy on which
this study builds is Karabatsos (2003), though that study’s
conclusions are skewed by a problematic approach to
the calculation of PFSs’ power to detect aberrance, as
explained and corrected in Sinharay (2017). Here, I
summarize the data simulation approach used in those
studies, as replication of these simulations is the first of
the two sets of analyses that make up this study. The
second set of simulations, outlined in the next section,
improves upon several aspects of those done by Karabatsos
(2003)/Sinharay (2017) to make simulation conditions more
realistic. I report the results of both the replication and the
new simulations.
First, a means of simulating normal (non-aberrant)
responses is selected; in this case, responses were simulated
using the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960). The Rasch model
stipulates that for a given person n with “ability” θ j and item
j with “difficulty” δ j , the probability Pn j1 of the examinee
responding correctly is calculated as

Test security is often described as a validity issue
(Wollack & Fremer, 2013; Xia & Zheng, 2018), and rightly
so; if examinees’ scores do not reflect their ability relative
to the targeted construct, any subsequent action based on
test scores may be targeting the wrong people. This is a
particularly important concern when tests have high stakes,
such as professional licensure or college admissions. Just
as test security is partially a matter of validity, so too
can one consider the validity of the means by which test
security is enforced. If actions–investigation of examinees,
removal of compromised items from test forms, and so
on–are to be taken as a result of statistical analyses,
then one must demonstrate that those analyses actually
provide actionable evidence of which examinees and/or
1
items warrant investigation. Therefore, the suggestion that
Pn j1 =
(1)
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]
PFSs be used in test security (Kim et al., 2017; Olson &
Fremer, 2013; Sinharay, 2016a; Wollack & Fremer, 2013; where θ j and δ j are on a common scale (this is not the
Xia & Zheng, 2018) warrants substantial scrutiny.
original parameterization of the model, but is presented
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here for its concise form). Simulation of item responses
from this model is straightforward once one has defined the
distribution of the ability and difficulty parameters.
Next, five types of aberrance are defined. As noted
above, these are: cheating, creative responding, random
responding, lucky guessing, and responding carelessly. For
each type of aberrance, one must define how the calculation
of Pn j1 differs from (1).
For cheating respondents, abilities are uniformly
distributed from -2 to -0.5, and the probability of a correct
response is constrained to 1 for items with difficulty δ j ≥
−1.5. This represents a scenario in which less able
respondents gain access to correct answers for the hardest
items on an exam. The equation to calculate Pn j1 for a
cheating examinee is therefore

Pn j1 = I[[1.5,2](δ j )]] + I[[−2,1.49](δ j )]

1
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]

(2)

where I[[x, y](z)] is an indicator variable taking on value 1 if
x ≤ z ≤ y and 0 otherwise.
For respondents responding creatively, abilities are
uniformly distributed from 0.5 to 2, and probability of
correct response is constrained to 0 for items with difficulty
δ j ≤ −1.5. This appears to represent a situation in which
highly able respondents read additional meaning into very
easy items and respond in a way that does not match the
intent of the item. The equation to calculate Pn j1 for an
examinee responding creatively is therefore
Pn j1 = I[[−1.49,2](δ j )]]

1
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]

(3)

Pn j1 = 0.25I[[.5,2](δ j )]] + I[[−2,.49](δ j )]]

1
(5)
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]

For respondents responding carelessly, abilities are
uniformly distributed from 0.5 to 2, and probability of
correct response is constrained to 0.5 for items with
difficulty δ j ≤ −0.5. This represents a situation in which
more able examinees rush through or misread easy items,
reducing their likelihood of responding correctly to those
items. The equation to calculate Pn j1 for a careless
examinee is therefore

Pn j1 = 0.5I[[−2,−.5](δ j )]] +I[[−.49,2](δ j )]]

1
(6)
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]

Once the various types of response have been defined,
the next step is to define the different test lengths and
proportions of aberrant responding for the crossed dataset
simulation design. Here, the three test lengths are 17,
33 and 65 items, and the four proportions of aberrant
respondents are 0.05, 0.10, 0.25 and 0.50. Sinharay (2017)
and Karabatsos (2003) differ in the size of each dataset;
Karabatsos uses a size of 500 while Sinharay uses 10,000.
The use of 10,000 examinees per dataset greatly reduces
the standard error of subsequent calculations of power, and
also aligns more closely with the expected sample size for a
large scale test. Here I use 10,000 as well. From here, one
can then simulate datasets as follows:
For every test length l, aberrance type t, and proportion
of aberrance p:

This equation produces a value of 0 for any item with δ j ≤
−1.5.
For random responding, every item was assigned a
probability of a correct response of 0.25, mirroring the
process of purely guessing on a multiple-choice item with
four options. The equation to calculate Pn j1 for an examinee
responding at random is therefore

1. Assign “true” item difficulties (δ j ) for all items
(of which there are l) and “true” abilities (θn )
for all non-aberrant examinees [of whom there are
10,000*(1-p)]. Both difficulties and abilities are
uniformly distributed between -2 and 2.

Pn j1 = 0.25

2. Assign “true” abilities (θn ) for all aberrant examinees
(of whom there are 10,000*p). The distribution of
these abilities depends on t, as described above.

(4)

For respondents exhibiting so-called “lucky” guessing,
abilities are uniformly distributed from -2 to -0.5, and
probability of correct response is constrained to 0.25 for
items with difficulty δ j ≥ 0.5. The equation to calculate
Pn j1 for a guessing examinee is therefore

3. Use the Rasch Model (1) to simulate the item
responses of all non-aberrant examinees to all items
by treating every response of person n to item j as a
Bernoulli-distributed random variable taking on value
1 with probability Pn j1 and 0 otherwise.
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4. Use one of Equations (2)–(6) to simulate the item
responses of all aberrant examinees to all items by
1
Pn j1 = I[ j∈{comp}] + I[ j∈{comp}]
(7)
treating every response of person n to item j as a
/
1 + exp [δ j − θn ]
Bernoulli-distributed random variable taking on value
1 with probability Pn j1 and 0 otherwise.
where I[ j∈comp] indicates that item j was compromised and
I[ j∈comp]
indicates that it was not.
/
These simulations differ from the prior studies in how
At this point, one has constructed 60 separate datasets aberrant respondents are selected from the larger group of
(3 lengths × 4 proportions of aberrant responding × 5 examinees. In prior studies, the proportion of aberrant
types of aberrant responding) of 10,000 examinees’ item respondents was used to “set aside” some examinees from
responses. The first set of simulations in this study replicate the larger population, and then the abilities of the aberrant
and non-aberrant examinees were simulated from separate
this approach exactly.
uniform distributions. In the present study, I begin by
3.2 New Simulations
simulating the abilities of all 10,000 examinees from a
The second set of simulations in this study modifies the standard normal distribution. I simulate aberrance after
methodology of the first in several key ways, summarized the ability distribution for all 10,000 examinees has been
in Table 1 and described in more detail below.
simulated, which guarantees that the overall distribution
The number of examinees in each dataset was 10,000, of ability among all examinees remains normal and is not
as in Sinharay (2017), which produces very low standard distorted by the proportion of aberrant examinees. This is
errors on the metric used to assess each PFS’s power of particular concern for the datasets in the original studies
to detect cheating (discussed below) and more closely where 25% or more of responses are simulated as aberrant.
resembles the sample sizes found in typical large scale
To simulate cheating, with a proportion of aberrance
assessment contexts. I again used the Rasch model to p, I select 10,000*p respondents by selecting at random
simulate non-aberrant responses.
among all examinees with “true” ability below -0.5. This
The equations for all types of aberrance except cheating mirrors the original studies’ choice of an upper limit on
[(3)-(6)] remain identical to those in the original studies. I the distribution of ability among cheaters, though their
used a different approach to simulate the effect of cheating lower bound of -2 does not make sense to implement
on item responses. Karabatsos’s definition of cheating is, when ability follows a standard normal distribution. As
“[c]heating (e.g., copying from another examinee) refers to a result, these simulations also follow the assumption
behavior where the examinee unfairly obtains the correct that high-ability examinees do not cheat. This is a
answers on test items that he/she is unable to answer limitation that future studies should address. A similar
correctly” (Karabatsos, 2003, p. 278). This describes a logic underlies the approaches to simulating aberrance for
scenario in which a group of examinees gain unauthorized the remaining types. Creative responders are selected from
access to test items before the test is administered, such as examinees with ability above 0.5, guessers are selected
from an examinee who has already taken the test. When from examinees with ability below -0.5, careless responders
this happens, there is no reason to believe that they will are selected from examinees with ability above 0.5, and
specifically gain access to only the very hardest items on random respondents are selected from examinees with
the test. Instead of simulating cheating by guaranteeing ability below -0.5.
that cheating students answer the most difficult items
The crossed design of the simulated datasets in this
correctly, I simulated cheating by selecting a random subset study also differs. I do not consider the scenario in
of the harder 50% of test items and marking them as which fully half of all responses are aberrant, instead
compromised–that is, an item j can only be compromised considering the scenario where only 1% are; the notion
if δ j > 0. Cheating students were guaranteed to get these that fully half of the examinees taking a high-stakes test
items right, but some hard items were not compromised, would respond aberrantly struck me as less likely than a
producing Rasch-generated responses to these items from very small proportion doing so. Additionally, the prior
cheating examinees. Let comp represent the subset of items studies simulated each type of aberrance in isolation. As
that have been marked compromised. The equation used to the present focus is on cheating, the only type of aberrance
calculate a cheating examinee’s responses is
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Table 1
Crossed Designs in Karabatsos (2003)/Sinharay (2017) and Current Study
Dimension

Original studies

Current study

Proportion of total aberrance

• 0.05
• 0.10
• 0.25
• 0.50

• 0.01
• 0.05
• 0.10
• 0.25

Test length

• 17
• 33
• 65

• 17
• 33
• 65

Aberrance type

• Cheating
• Creative responding
• Random responding
• Lucky guessing
• Responding carelessly

• Cheating only
• Cheating + creative
• Cheating + random
• Cheating + guessing
• Cheating + careless

simulated in isolation is cheating. Instead of simulating the
other types of aberrance in isolation, I simulate cheating
alongside one of each of the other four aberrance types. In
all scenarios, the proportion of total aberrance is divided
evenly among the aberrance types in the scenario. Table
1 summarizes both crossed designs. After simulating the
responses of all examinees in each dataset, the next step is to
generate estimated item difficulty parameters and examinee
ability estimates. As in Sinharay (2017), I used the R (R
Core Team, 2020) package ltm (Rizopoulos, 2006) for item
difficulty estimation via marginal maximum likelihood and
estimated examinees’ ability via maximum likelihood using
the irtoys package (Partchev, 2017).
3.3

Selection of PFSs for Comparison

Karabatsos’s 2003 original study compared the power
of 36 PFSs, while Sinharay’s 2017 reconsideration of
Karabatsos’s work considered four of these 36; H T , U3 ,
lz , and ECI4z . These comprise both parametric and
nonparametric statistics that have, in studies other than
Karabatsos’s, been shown to have similar power. Here,
I consider eight statistics. The first two are H T and
U3 , as in Sinharay (2017). However, rather than use lz
and ECI4z , I use lz∗ (Snijders, 2001) and ζ2∗ (Sinharay,
2016a). Because ζ2∗ is an asymptotic correction of ECI4z ,
for clarity, I instead refer to ζ2∗ as ECI4∗z . In both
cases, the ∗ indicates the asymptotically normal corrected
version of the statistic, derived using Snijders 2001’s

asymptotic correction. Prior work has demonstrated that
the uncorrected lz has less power to detect aberrance than
anticipated when its theoretical null distribution is derived
using true ability parameters (Meijer & Sijtsma, 2001),
and Sinharay (2016a) demonstrated that ECI4∗z is generally
superior in power to detect aberrance to its uncorrected
counterpart. This study therefore investigates whether
the asymptotic corrections of lz , and ECI4z provide any
meaningful improvement in power to detect aberrance
compared to their uncorrected counterparts. Snijders (2001)
notes that the asymptotic corrections he outlines produce
the least benefit for the Rasch model compared to more
complex IRT models such as the two- or three-parameter
logistic models, but the corrected statistics should perform
at least as well as their uncorrected counterparts when the
Rasch model is employed.
In addition to H T , U3 , lz∗ , and ECI4∗z , I also consider four
PFSs that were proposed specifically to detect spuriously
high scores. These are Xia and Zheng (2018)’s SHa(λ )∗
and SHb(β )∗ , each with two different values of their
respective parameter as Xia & Zheng suggest, producing
the four separate PFSs: SHa(1/2)∗ , SHa(1)∗ , SHb(2)∗ and
SHb(3)∗ . In all cases, the statistics follow an asymptotically
standard normal distribution, where high values of the index
indicate response patterns producing scores suspected of
being spuriously high (it is important to remember that
PFSs, and IRT as a whole, cannot ever tell us true ability
levels directly, and so cannot ever tell us with certainty if
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a score is truly “spurious.”). As described above, all four
of these PFSs are conceptually similar to lz∗ and ECI4∗z , but
with an asymmetric weighting function (see Magis et al.,
2012 for a didactic explanation of the role of weighting
functions in the calculation of lz∗ .); these statistics are all
part of the family of PFSs described in Snijders (2001).
Because these indices’ power to detect spuriously high
scores should be greater than their power to detect low
scores, they appear to be better suited to the purpose
of employing PFSs in test security. This practice is
described in several guides to test security (Kim et al.,
2017; Olson & Fremer, 2013; Wollack & Fremer, 2013)
but its validity is still debated due to the lack of research
on the connection between PFSs and proposed sources of
aberrance (Meijer & Tendeiro, 2012; Wainer, 2012). If
weighted PFSs outperform their traditional counterparts,
then this helps narrow in on how one might use PFSs most
productively in test security. However, in investigating
these statistics’ use in detecting simulated cheating, Xia
and Zheng (2018) also found inflated Type I error rates
under certain conditions. Type I errors are concerning for
two reasons. First, if PFSs are to be used as even one
method of many to detect cheating by examinees, Type
I errors are crucial, as they equate to a false accusation
of cheating. At its worst, an inflated Type I error rate
means many false positives relative to each true positive,
calling into question the efficiency of using PFSs in test
security. Second, on the test development side, the use
of PFSs to initiate investigations into compromised items
assumes that the PFSs provide at least some reason to be
concerned that items are compromised. If PFSs tell us little
or nothing about which examinees responded aberrantly,
then using them for any purpose related to test security
appears ill-advised.
I calculated H T , U3 , and lz∗ using the PerFit R package
(Tendeiro et al., 2016); SHa(1/2)∗ , SHa(1)∗ , SHb(2)∗
and SHb(3)∗ using R code based upon Magis et al.
(2012) as recommended in Xia and Zheng (2018); and
ECI4∗z using code written by the author in accordance
with Sinharay (2016a). Data management and figure
creation was conducted using the tidyverse (Wickham et al.,
2019). Key portions of the R code used in this study are
available in the appendix2 to this study. I also refer readers
to Sinharay (2017), which contains a link to a Github
repository containing much of the code used in that study.
2 Available

supplementals

at

3.4
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Comparing PFSs With AUROCs and PPV

Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves (Hanley
& McNeil, 1982) can be used to compare continuous
statistics intended to dichotomously classify subjects by
comparing the true positive and false positive rates
produced when different values of the statistic are used as a
cutoff to classify subjects. An example ROC for a relatively
powerful statistic can be found in Figure 1. A statistic with
no power would produce an ROC that resembles a straight
diagonal line where true and false positive rate are equal.
Figure 1
Example ROC curve

Interpretation and comparison of ROCs is based upon the
area under the ROC (in keeping with Sinharay [2017], I
refer to this as AUROC; it is also known as AUC or a).
A very powerful statistic will produce an AUROC near
1, as the true positive rate will be nearly 1 at almost all
values of the false positive rate. In contrast, a statistic with
low power will produce an AUROC near, or even below,
0.5. An AUROC of 0.5 indicates zero accuracy–the statistic
is no better at flagging true positives than flagging false
ones. An AUROC below 0.5 indicates that the statistic
does have power if classifications are inverted. Sinharay
(2017) concluded that the four PFSs considered in his
study were approximately equally powerful for detecting
aberrance by calculating AUROCs for each statistic for each
of the 60 simulated datasets and finding that the AUROCs
of the various statistics were generally very close when
summarized over different test lengths. Moreover, the
overall AUROCs reported by Sinharay (2017) are close to
one another and fairly high (0.83-0.84 for all four statistics).
This study also uses AUROCs to compare the power
of PFSs to detect specific examinee behavior.
As
described above, this study contains two sets of simulations.
First, I replicate Karabatsos (2003)/Sinharay (2017)’s
methodology, then I conduct new simulations in which
https://www.ncme.org/publications/cejeme/ cheating is mixed with other simulated behaviors. This
requires two different sets of AUROC analyses. For the
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replication, I use Sinharay (2017)’s methodology exactly,
meaning that AUROCs are used to express how well
different statistics can distinguish among aberrant and
non-aberrant response patterns. For the simulations with
mixed aberrance types, instead of using each PFS to classify
examinees as aberrant or non-aberrant, I use each PFS to
classify examinees as cheating or non-cheating and base
AUROCs on that instead. Here, a true positive occurs when
the PFS flags an examinee whose responses were simulated
as cheating from equation (7), while a false positive
occurs when the PFS flags as cheating an examinee whose
responses were produced by any other type of response,
including other types of aberrance. For all AUROC-based
analysis, I used the ROCR package (Sing et al., 2005).
To compare the power of the eight PFSs in both
sets of simulations, I use several aggregations of the
individual AUROCs, of which there are sixty. First, I
compare the overall “average” AUROC for each PFS. As
Sinharay (2017) notes, a meta-analytic method such as
the Dersimonian-Laird algorithm (DerSimonian & Laird,
1986) will produce the best estimates of the average
AUROC, since each AUROC is subject to measurement
error and has a standard error. I used the Dersimonian-Laird
algorithm as well, as implemented in the metafor R package
(Viechtbauer, 2010). Next, I compare the average AUROCs
across each of the dimensions making up the crossed design
of the study: over each test length, over each type of
aberrance, and over each proportion of aberrance. This
provides some insight into whether certain PFSs exhibit
higher power in certain scenarios. For all three dimensions,
I use the Dersimonian-Laird algorithm to produce an
average AUROC for each value of the conditions–for
example, average AUROCs for each statistic for 17-item
tests, 33-item tests, and 65-item tests.
For length only, for both the replication and new
simulations, I also produce an additional comparison,
following Sinharay (2017)’s corrected approach to
aggregating over all tests of a given length to produce a
single AUROC. The approach is as follows, and is identical
to that used by Sinharay (2017):
1. For a given test length, combine all 10,000-response
datasets into a single dataset of 200,000 examinees.
Keep track of who is aberrant/cheating and who is not.
2. Estimate a single set of item difficulty parameters
from the combined dataset using marginal maximum
likelihood.

3. Estimate a single set of examinee ability parameters
from the combined dataset using maximum likelihood.
4. Compute each PFS for all examinees in the combined
dataset.
5. Calculate AUROCs for each PFS based upon the
values in (4).
This approach produces a single AUROC per PFS
that corresponds to the power of that PFS to detect
aberrance/cheating when many types of aberrance are
present at once. For each test length, there are 20 datasets
of that test length, within which every type of aberrance is
present. The combined 200,000-examinee dataset therefore
contains every type of aberrance at once. The power of
each statistic to detect cheating within this large dataset
with many types of aberrance likely corresponds closely to
circumstances under which actual test security investigators
operate, where examinees taking a large-scale test exhibit
a variety of aberrance types and the investigator does not
know the types or amounts of aberrance present (Sinharay,
2017). This scenario is not comprehensive, though, as
different tests probably produce different amounts and types
of aberrance (for example, a professional licensure exam
versus a K-12 accountability test). Moreover, there is no
analogous way to aggregate to a single AUROC for the
other dimensions of the crossed design. Aggregations using
the Dersimonian-Laird algorithm therefore help provide a
more comprehensive picture of each PFS’s power to detect
cheating/aberrance.
Finally, for any simulations that involve cheating
alongside another aberrance type, I conclude by considering
the number of examinees that each statistic flags and the
percentage of the flagged examinees who were actually
cheating when a specific critical value is used to distinguish
flagged from non-flagged examinees, known as positive
predictive value (PPV). Sinharay (2017) includes a related
but distinct analysis looking at what percentage of aberrant
examinees were flagged for each test length, which is
the true positive rate or sensitivity. Similarly, one can
calculate specificity/true negative rate, the proportion of
non-cheating examinees who were not flagged. While both
of these statistics are widely used, they often do not tell the
full story when it comes to the value of a given statistic
for making useful predictions. It is my contention that
what matters most operationally is the proportion of the
flagged examinees who actually cheated, which is what
PPV expresses. If a PFS flags a very high proportion of
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Table 2
Overall AUROCs Eight Person-Fit Statistics for Detecting Aberrance
lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

0.84

0.84

0.83

0.83

0.83

0.83

0.80

0.75

Table 3
AUROCs for Combined Datasets by Test Length, Original Simulations
Target

Items

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

Cheating

17
33
65

0.92
0.93
0.93

0.91
0.92
0.92

0.91
0.92
0.92

0.92
0.92
0.93

0.95
0.96
0.96

0.97
0.98
0.98

0.79
0.81
0.84

0.68
0.70
0.74

Aberrance

17
33
65

0.91
0.95
0.98

0.91
0.95
0.98

0.90
0.95
0.97

0.91
0.95
0.97

0.90
0.95
0.98

0.90
0.94
0.98

0.88
0.92
0.95

0.82
0.86
0.89

cheating examinees, but also many more times non-cheaters
than cheaters, then the value of person fit analysis in such
a scenario appears to be minimal. In such a scenario, the
PFS would have high sensitivity and could also have very
high specificity. For example, consider a scenario of 10,000
examinees where 100 have cheated, corresponding to the
1% aberrance condition in the second set of simulations.
A PFS might flag 95 cheaters as cheating, leading to 95%
sensitivity. Now, imagine that the PFS also flags 900
non-cheaters. Specificity is thus 91%. PPV, however, is
about 10%. While not being flagged in such a scenario
corresponds to a very low probability of having cheated,
there is also a fairly low probability that a given flagged
examinee truly cheated. Thus, in this scenario, being
flagged as cheating by the given PFS is only very weak
evidence of cheating. However, when cheating is more
prevalent, PPV likely tells a similar story to sensitivity and
specificity. I report PPV in this study because it appears to
correspond most closely to the types of judgments for which
PFSs are used.

4
4.1

Findings
Results: Original Simulations

This section presents results of replicating the
simulations of Karabatsos (2003) and Sinharay (2017),
then fitting the eight PFSs specified in this study.
Overall AUROCs calculated using the Dersimonian-Laird
algorithm are found in Table 2. The AUROCs for H T
and U3 are almost identical to those found in Sinharay

(2017). lz∗ and ECI4∗z , asymptotically-corrected versions of
the parametric statistics used in Sinharay (2017), produce
average AUROCs that are again nearly identical to those
found in Sinharay (2017); as the original study reports
AUROCs to two decimal places, it is unknown exactly
how close the AUROCs found here are to those found in
his study, but it is clear that if the asymptotic corrections
yield any additional power, it is a very small amount, and
that H T , lz∗ and ECI4∗z are of essentially equal power. This
is not entirely unexpected given that item responses were
simulated from the Rasch model. Turning to the weighted
PFSs, we can see that SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ appear to be
of approximately equal power to the traditional PFSs, while
SHb(2)∗ and especially SHb(3)∗ appear less powerful; no
weighted PFS outperforms the traditional PFSs.
Recall that the AUROCs here represent power to detect
aberrance writ-large. Because most datasets in the original
simulation contain no cheating, it does not make sense to
try to calculate AUROCs that represent power to detect
cheating specifically. However, as described above, one
can combine all of the datasets of a given test length
to produce a single very large dataset that contains all
types of aberrance. From these, one can then produce
AUROCs either for detecting all aberrance or for detecting
cheating specifically. Results of doing so are found in Table
3. Results indicate that the traditional PFSs are roughly
equally powered to detect both aberrance writ large and
cheating specifically, and that this power is fairly strong, in
the 0.91-0.93 range for tests of all three lengths. However,
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for this large dataset with many types of aberrance present
at once, SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ outperform the traditional
statistics when trying to detect cheating specifically. Still, as
shown in Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6, the average AUROC
for the original 10,000-examinee datasets was roughly the
same for the traditional PFSs and for SHa(1/2)∗ , while
SHa(1)∗ appears slightly underpowered in most scenarios
compared to the traditional PFSs; SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗
remain noticeably underpowered for most scenarios. This
more closely mirrors the findings in Table 2, which also
aggregates over AUROCs calculated separately for each
dataset. Recall, however, that these results are for detecting
aberrance broadly, not cheating specifically, so they are less
relevant to test security than the findings in Table 3.
It appears that SHa(1/2)∗ is roughly as powerful as H T ,
U3 , lz∗ and ECI4∗z in scenarios with 10,000 examinees and
one type of aberrance, with SHa(1)∗ appearing slightly
underpowered. However, for a very large set of examinees
with all types of aberrance at once, SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗
both outperform the traditional statistics. Because the
combined datasets that produced the results in Table 3
correspond more closely to a real test security investigation
than the individual 10,000-item datasets per Sinharay
(2017), this appears to be evidence that SHa(1/2)∗
and SHa(1)∗ may be more appropriate for some test
security applications (large examinee pool, many types of
aberrance) but slightly worse for smaller examinee pools
where cheating is the only type of aberrance (see Table 5).
However, as described above, most of the datasets in the
original simulation contain no cheating, so they cannot be
used to investigate power to detect cheating; this can only
be done for the datasets that aggregate over test lengths,
and each dataset has a fixed proportion of aberrance as
well as proportion of cheating. This motivated the revised
simulations whose results are described in the next section.
4.2

Results: Revised Simulations

This section presents findings based upon the revised set
of simulations in which cheating is simulated alongside
another type of aberrance. Results indicate that the
power of the weighted PFSs SHa(1/2)∗ , SHa(1)∗ , SHb(2)∗
and SHb(3)∗ to detect cheating examinees specifically is
generally inferior to the power of the traditional PFSs,
which exhibit nearly identical power to detect cheating
examinees. As shown in Table 7, SHa(1/2)∗ ’s overall
average AUROC came closest to that of the traditional
PFSs, with SHb(3)∗ ’s falling lowest; AUROCs are lower
than in the original simulations for all statistics, but

fall more for the weighted PFSs. Figure 2 shows that
the distributions of the AUROCs also differ substantially.
In particular, AUROCs for SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ are
distributed more widely than for the traditional PFSs,
and are skewed lower, producing lower average AUROCs
despite similar medians. This means that in some scenarios,
these PFSs exhibit exceptionally poor power relative to the
traditional PFSs, even as they perform similarly or better in
others. I explore this further below.
Figure 2
Distribution of AUROCs, Revised Simulations

Turning to the AUROCs for the 200,000-examinee
combined datasets for each test length (Table 8), results
are similar to those found when using data generated in
the original simulations, with SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗
exhibiting slightly higher power to detect cheating than
the traditional PFSs, though this gap all but disappears for
longer test lengths. SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ also appear
to detect general aberrance with about the same power as
the traditional statistics. As in the original simulations,
SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗ are the two least powerful statistics
in all scenarios.
The average AUROCS in Table 7 are largely consistent
across the other levels of aggregation, as shown in Tables
9–11, though in some scenarios, the performance of
SHa(1/2)∗ was on par with or slightly better than that
of the traditional PFSs. However, SHa(1/2)∗ was less
powerful than the traditional PFSs with a high (25%) rate
of aberrance, while SHb(2)∗ appears to be more powerful
with this rate of aberrance. Overall, it remains the case that
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Table 4
AUROCs for Detecting Aberrance by Test Length, Original Simulations
Length

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

17
33
65

0.80
0.84
0.87

0.81
0.85
0.87

0.80
0.84
0.87

0.80
0.83
0.86

0.80
0.84
0.87

0.79
0.83
0.86

0.77
0.80
0.83

0.72
0.75
0.77

Table 5
AUROCs for Detecting Aberrance by Aberrance Type, Original Simulations
Type

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

Cheating
Creative
Guessing
Careless
Random

0.87
0.70
0.88
0.73
0.86

0.88
0.67
0.89
0.69
0.86

0.86
0.71
0.87
0.73
0.85

0.87
0.70
0.88
0.73
0.86

0.85
0.69
0.86
0.73
0.84

0.81
0.67
0.81
0.72
0.81

0.83
0.69
0.83
0.68
0.80

0.77
0.66
0.76
0.64
0.74

Table 6
AUROCs for Detecting Aberrance by Percent Aberrant, Original Simulations
Percent

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

5%
10%
25%
50%

0.95
0.94
0.87
0.59

0.94
0.94
0.89
0.60

0.94
0.94
0.87
0.59

0.94
0.94
0.87
0.59

0.94
0.94
0.87
0.59

0.93
0.92
0.84
0.61

0.91
0.90
0.81
0.60

0.85
0.84
0.73
0.56

Table 7
Overall AUROCs Eight Person-Fit Statistics for Detecting Cheating
lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

0.81

0.80

0.81

0.81

0.79

0.76

0.77

0.71

the weighted PFSs tended to be underpowered compared to
the traditional PFSs.
As Figure 3 shows, the relative power of the PFSs
does differ somewhat by test length, but the distributions
of the AUROCs for the weighted PFSs follows a fairly
consistent pattern. AUROCs for SHb(3)∗ are tightly
dispersed and low; they are slightly higher and more spread
out for SHb(2)∗ , but the distribution is skewed toward
lower AUROCs. The 75th percentile of the AUROCs
for SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ are actually higher for 17and 33-item tests, but for all test lengths, these statistics
produce the most widely dispersed AUROCs. While they

perform very well for certain datasets, this performance is
not consistent.
Comparing each statistic’s power across different
combinations of aberrance in Figure 4 and Table 10
is also revealing. When the nature of the aberrance
among examinees is cheating only, cheating plus guessing,
or cheating plus random responding, the power of all
statistics except SHb(3)∗ is at least 0.8. However, power
drops substantially, below 0.74, for all statistics when
cheating happens alongside careless responding or creative
responding. It appears that careless and creative responses
are likelier to be flagged as misfitting alongside cheating

45

Student

Table 8
AUROCs for Combined Datasets by Test Length, Revised Simulations
Items

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

Cheating

17
33
65

0.92
0.90
0.96

0.92
0.90
0.96

0.92
0.90
0.95

0.92
0.90
0.96

0.95
0.92
0.97

0.95
0.92
0.97

0.79
0.81
0.90

0.71
0.72
0.82

Aberrance

17
33
65

0.87
0.90
0.94

0.86
0.90
0.94

0.86
0.90
0.94

0.87
0.90
0.94

0.87
0.91
0.94

0.86
0.89
0.93

0.80
0.84
0.91

0.75
0.78
0.85

Target

Table 9
AUROCs for Detecting Cheating by Test Length, Revised Simulations
Length

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

17
33
65

0.78
0.79
0.85

0.77
0.79
0.84

0.78
0.79
0.85

0.78
0.80
0.85

0.78
0.78
0.82

0.75
0.75
0.79

0.72
0.75
0.83

0.68
0.69
0.77

when compared to guessing or random responding. This
seems to make sense in terms of the different types
of aberrance. Careless and creative responding produce
spuriously low scores for high examinees on easy items.
These examinees’ correct responses to hard items then
appear aberrant, even though those responses are the ones
that actually reflect the examinees’ “normal” response
process. That said, SHa(1/2)∗ and especially SHa(1)∗
produce much wider distributions of AUROCs for the
scenarios where cheating occurs alongside guessing and
random responding than the other PFSs. This means that
these statistics may not produce consistent classifications
even in the scenarios in which other PFSs perform best.
Finally, the picture becomes even more complicated
when AUROCs are broken out by the proportion of aberrant
respondents in Figure 5/Table 11. While SHb(2)∗ and
SHb(3)∗ produce the lowest AUROCs at 1%, 5% and
10% aberrance, they produce the highest AUROCs at
25%, while SHa(1/2)∗ and especially SHa(1)∗ lose power
precipitously at 25% aberrance. Overall, there is no single
“best” PFS among the weighted statistics.
4.3

PPV Analysis

It is not necessarily clear from the AUROCs alone what
the implications of these findings are for a process that
involves trying to identify cheaters using PFSs. There are
two reasons for this. First, the AUROC does not itself

contain information about the proportion of true positives
among all positives, meaning that a statistic might flag
far more non-cheating examinees than cheating examinees
even if its AUROC is relatively high. Second, the AUROC
is a summary over all possible critical values (cutoff values
to delineate flagged from non-flagged examinees) of a given
statistic, making it difficult to translate from an AUROC
into, for example, a raw number of true or false positives in
a given scenario. This requires identifying a single critical
value.
To try to make clear the implications of the AUROCs
observed here, I summarized the average number of total
(true and false) positives (out of 10,000 total examinees)
that result from the use of each statistic at each proportion
of aberrant respondents, as well as PPV, the percentage
of flagged examinees who were truly cheating. Here, I
use a specific critical value for each statistic. Most of
the statistics follow an asymptotically standard normal null
distribution: SHa(1/2)∗ , SHa(1)∗ , SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗
all share this null distribution, as do lz∗ and ECI4∗z . For these
statistics, I set the critical value to 1.64 or -1.64, depending
on whether high or low values of the statistic indicate
aberrance. This corresponds to an α level (type I error rate
when no aberrance is present) of 0.05. For H T and U3 , I first
standardized the statistics so that equivalent critical values
could be used. It is important to note that I standardized
across all examinees, cheating or otherwise, in line with
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Table 10
AUROCs for Detecting Cheating by Aberrance Type, Revised Simulations
Type
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.

only
+ creative
+ guessing
+ careless
+ random

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

0.87
0.70
0.88
0.73
0.86

0.88
0.67
0.89
0.69
0.86

0.86
0.71
0.87
0.73
0.85

0.87
0.70
0.88
0.73
0.86

0.85
0.69
0.86
0.73
0.84

0.81
0.67
0.81
0.72
0.81

0.83
0.69
0.83
0.68
0.80

0.77
0.66
0.76
0.64
0.74

Table 11
AUROCs for Detecting Cheating by Percent Aberrant, Revised Simulations
Percent

lz∗

HT

U3

ECI4∗z

SHa(1/2)∗

SHa(1)∗

SHb(2)∗

SHb(3)∗

1%
5%
10%
25%

0.89
0.85
0.82
0.67

0.88
0.85
0.81
0.67

0.89
0.85
0.82
0.68

0.90
0.86
0.82
0.68

0.91
0.85
0.81
0.62

0.90
0.83
0.78
0.55

0.81
0.79
0.77
0.71

0.74
0.73
0.72
0.67

Table 12
Number of Flagged Examinees and Percentage of Truly Cheating by Percentage of Aberrant Cases

Statistic
ECI4∗z
HT
lz∗
SHa(1)∗
SHa(1/2)∗
SHb(2)∗
SHb(3)∗
U3

1% aberrant
Count
PPV
565
530
578
626
587
613
718
583

6.4%
6.7%
6.2%
6.0%
6.4%
3.7%
2.3%
6.1%

5% aberrant
Count
PPV
687
552
701
728
711
690
749
592

21.4%
22.7%
20.8%
17.1%
19.8%
15.2%
10.6%
21.1%

a scenario in which an investigator does not know which
examinees have cheated or otherwise responded aberrantly.
This may be a disadvantage of using nonparametric PFSs in
practice.
Table 12 contains the results of this analysis. For each
statistic, across each percentage of examinees modeled
as aberrant, I present the mean number of flagged
examinees (out of 10,000) and PPV when a critical value
corresponding to an α level of 0.05 is used to separate
flagged examinees from non-flagged. We can see that
for every statistic and percent of aberrant respondents,

10% aberrant
Count
PPV
838
615
856
831
849
806
812
645

30.5%
30.6%
29.5%
22.5%
27.8%
23.5%
17.5%
28.7%

25% aberrant
Count
PPV
998
664
995
900
944
1052
959
701

25.2%
18.7%
22.5%
8.0%
15.3%
30.8%
28.2%
17.8%

the average percentage of flagged examinees who were
truly cheating is at or below 30.8%. When only 1% of
respondents are aberrant, the fewest examinees tend to be
flagged, but PPV is also lowest; when more respondents
are aberrant, both the number flagged and the proportion of
flagged examinees who cheated are higher. PPV remains
low, though. At high amounts of aberrance, the statistics
that produce the most true positives among the examinees
they flag are SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗ , which AUROC-based
analyses showed to generally be the least powerful statistics
in cases with less aberrance.
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Figure 3
Distribution of AUROCs by Test Length, Revised
Simulations

Figure 4
Distribution of AUROCs by Aberrance Type, Revised
Simulations

I also completed the same analysis using the same
cutoff for the 200,000-examinee datasets produced when
following Sinharay (2017)’s methodology for aggregating
over test length. Here, I compared results from the datasets
from the original simulations (replication of Karabatsos
[2003]/Sinharay [2017]) to results from the datasets in
the new simulations introduced in this study. Results are
presented in Table 13. There is a clear difference in the
statistics’ value in detecting cheating, expressed by PPV,
between the original simulation conditions and the revised
conditions. For the revised simulations, PPV is generally
far lower, especially on the shortest test length. However,
relative to the other PFSs, SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗ perform
far worse under the conditions of the original simulation for
longer test lengths. Meanwhile we can see that on average,
SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ perform best on longer tests for
both combined datasets, but that their superior performance
on 17-item tests under conditions from Sinharay (2017)
does not hold up under the new conditions introduced in
this study. This underscores the inconsistent relationship

between the power of specific PFSs to detect cheating and
the generating conditions of the data. Ultimately, there is no
clear winner in Table 13, but SHb(2)∗ and SHb(3)∗ produce
the lowest average PPV values under most conditions.

5

Discussion

This study finds that for relatively small (10,000
examinees) datasets, PFSs constructed specifically to detect
spuriously high scores are rarely any better at flagging
cheating than traditional PFSs, and are often worse for this
task. I am aware of two reasons why this might be the
case. First, it may be the case that the specific statistics
investigated here are too specific in the type of aberrance
they detect most effectively:

SHb(2)∗ (i.e., β = 2) and SHb(3)∗ (i.e., β =
3) have relatively
large weights on the items

with Pn θ̂ < .3 compared with SHa(1/2)∗ and
SHa(1)∗ . The authors expect that SHb(2)∗
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Figure 5
Distribution of AUROCs by % Aberrant, Revised
Simulations

and SHb(3)∗ can have greater sensitivity to
detect spuriously high scores on items with .1 <
Pn θ̂ < .3, although they may lose some power

for the extremely difficult items with Pn θ̂ < .1
compared with SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ (Xia &
Zheng, 2018, p. 349).
These properties are at odds with the scenarios simulated
in this study, and potentially with the circumstances
under which cheating occurs in the real world. In this
study, examinees of a relatively wide range of true ability
(θ < −0.5) were simulated as cheating, and items on
which examinees cheated were selected at random from a
relatively wide range of difficulty (δ > 0). This means that
cheating respondents’ probability of a correct response on a
given item had they not cheated will vary widely based on
the examinee’s ability and the item’s difficulty. What Xia
and Zheng (2018) describe above gives reason to believe
that no one statistic of the four they propose is likely to be
uniformly most powerful even within a single dataset, much
less over all sixty simulated datasets.
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Table 13
Flagged Examinees and Percent Cheating for Combined
Datasets
Original
simulations

Revised
simulations

Test
length

Statistic

Count

PPV

Count

PPV

17

ECI4∗z
HT
lz∗
SHa(1)∗
SHa(1/2)∗
SHb(2)∗
SHb(3)∗
U3

15890
15622
16734
16380
16488
17063
15567
15870

26.0%
23.1%
26.5%
42.6%
35.6%
9.3%
4.5%
23.6%

13280
12510
13449
13916
13477
13470
14775
13214

5.2%
4.3%
4.6%
3.9%
4.1%
5.2%
3.9%
4.3%

33

ECI4∗z
HT
lz∗
SHa(1)∗
SHa(1/2)∗
SHb(2)∗
SHb(3)∗
U3

18007
17509
18676
17284
17973
18167
15324
17738

26.0%
24.5%
27.4%
45.1%
37.3%
6.6%
2.1%
25.0%

12773
11932
12676
12863
12832
11355
11073
12547

14.4%
14.1%
14.7%
16.2%
16.0%
8.7%
5.6%
13.3%

65

ECI4∗z
HT
lz∗
SHa(1)∗
SHa(1/2)∗
SHb(2)∗
SHb(3)∗
U3

21094
20646
21504
18909
20471
19550
15703
20745

25.3%
24.0%
26.4%
44.2%
36.4%
4.7%
0.8%
24.5%

13798
13119
13506
13101
13592
10581
8735
13409

21.8%
21.0%
21.5%
23.1%
22.7%
14.5%
9.1%
19.9%

Additionally, some types of non-cheating aberrant
responding–in this study, careless and creative
responding–are likely to appear to produce spuriously
high scores, even though they are actually producing
spuriously low scores. Both of these types of aberrance
involve examinees of high ability responding to easy
items in a way that makes their probability of a correct
response on those easy items lower than it “normally”
would be. This means that such respondents will have
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lower scores than expected on easy items, and their ability
estimates will be deflated as a result. Because the PFSs
intended to flag spuriously high scores place more weight
on correct answers to items that should be difficult for a
given examinee given their ability estimate, and because
the examinees being considered here will have their ability
estimates deflated, their correct responses to hard items
will appear unlikely and the PFSs will flag them as aberrant
even though their responses to hard items reflect those
examinees’ underlying ability. If the intent is to flag
cheating specifically, this is a problem.
However, when datasets are combined to produce a large
dataset (200,000 examinees) with all types of aberrance
present at once, SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗ are the most
powerful statistics in the study. It appears to be the
case that in some scenarios, SHa(1/2)∗ and SHa(1)∗
provide an advantage in the detection of cheating, but in
others, they provide a disadvantage. This further muddies
the task of trying to select a single “best” PFS for all
test security applications and reinforces the importance of
understanding the expected power of PFSs relative to the
anticipated behavior of test examinees. Still, a statistic is
not necessarily appropriate for test security use just because
it produces high AUROCs, which is why this study also
considered raw numbers of flagged examinees at a sensible
critical value and the proportion of those flagged examinees
who truly cheated, PPV. Results indicated that depending
on an investigator’s goals and the properties of a given
test, some of which (such as the true amount and nature of
aberrance) may not be known at the time of investigation,
different statistics will be most appropriate and useful.
Looking beyond relative power provided some evidence
of potential validity issues in a test security program
incorporating analysis of PFSs. In general, PFSs appear
likely to flag far more non-cheating respondents than
cheating respondents as aberrant, though this is again highly
contingent upon the behavior of examinees, test length, and
sample size. In the revised simulations, with α = 0.05
and 1% true aberrance, for every statistic, 93% or more
of the flagged examinees were not cheating. In light of
this finding, there are some applications in test security
where it appears that the value of person fit analysis as
supplementary evidence to identify cheating examinees is
minimal. If as few as one in fifty flagged examinees will
have actually cheated, then PFSs contribute very little to
the process of finding convergent evidence pointing to a
security violation (because even being flagged is associated
with only a very low probability of having cheated).

However, if one in three flagged examinees have cheated, as
found in some scenarios where cheating is more prevalent,
then PFSs appear to provide some value as supplementary
evidence after all. It is therefore important to try to
anticipate how PFSs will function given the characteristics
of a particular test (length, anticipated examinee behavior,
etc.) before using them operationally in test security.
The trouble, of course, is that the true proportion of
cheating examinees is essentially never known, certainly
not ahead of time, and this study shows that the meaning of
being flagged by person fit analysis can differ substantially
depending on this unknowable fact.
Test-specific simulations may help somewhat in this task,
but can only go so far because it is impossible under
almost all circumstances to know with certainty whether a
given examinee cheated, guessed, responded carelessly or
otherwise deviated from the normal response process. The
assumptions made in any test-specific simulations need to
be made explicit and organizations should be prepared to
discard PFSs in their security analyses if evidence emerges
that these assumptions were incorrect. There are many
other sources of evidence available for investigators of test
security problems with stronger theoretical connections to
cheating (Cizek & Wollack, 2017). While PFSs are easy
to calculate, the present study indicates that their value is
highly contingent upon unknowable aspects of examinee
behavior.
This study does, naturally, have a number of limitations
and extensions that further work can address. The most
pressing of these are the nature of aberrance simulated, the
types of test items, and the IRT model used. Future studies
should attempt to produce more realistic simulations of
cheating–as noted, it is unlikely that only lower-performing
students cheat, and detecting cheating among students of
all abilities is likely even harder than detecting it in the
scenarios simulated here. Extensions to this study should
also consider polytomous, clustered, and other complex
item types. Many PFSs are flexible enough for use with
a variety of item types, and work in this area is ongoing
(Sinharay, 2016b); further studies will hopefully provide
more insight into how PFSs should or should not be used
on tests with different item types.
Finally, this study simulated examinees’ responses
using the Rasch model. Other models, such as the
three-parameter logistic (3PL), may warrant investigation;
Sinharay (2017) finds lower (around 0.64) AUROCS and
inconsistent performance across different datasets when
the 3PL model is used for simulation and parameter
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estimation when compared to the Rasch model, so this
study likely represents a best-case scenario relative to
the same types of aberrance modeled using the 3PL.
However, in contrast, Drasgow (1982) found that when
the 3PL and 1PL/Rasch models were used model the
same item response dataset containing aberrant response
patterns interspersed with real data, detection under the
3PL was slightly more effective. Notably, Drasgow
used sensitivity (discussed previously) and false alarm
rate (proportion of non-aberrant respondents flagged as
aberrant) to evaluate effectiveness. The present study
demonstrated that different PFSs can look more or less
effective depending on evaluation criteria, so differences
in Drasgow’s and Sinharay (2017)’s findings may be a
matter of evaluation criteria, simulation conditions, or both.
Additionally, as the present study demonstrates, effective
detection of aberrance and effective detection of cheating
specifically can differ, and prior studies using the 3PL have
focused on detection of aberrance writ-large. Finally, Hong
et al. (2020) demonstrate that IRT model misspecification
can often lead to inflated Type I error rates, which are
related to the sometimes very low PPV values found in this
study. Misspecification is a concern in this study for the
“guessing” aberrance type, as the Rasch model does not
include a lower asymptote that can capture guessing, while
the 3PL does. Notably, however, Figure 4 and Table 10
show that guessing did not induce poor performance relative
to the other aberrance conditions; cheating was hardest to
detect when mixed with creative or careless responding, as
discussed above. It would be valuable to learn if this holds
under other IRT models. Certainly, the findings of this and
prior studies bring into focus the need to more thoroughly
explore the use of person fit analysis under the 3PL. The use
of the 3PL will also probably bring into sharper focus the
pitfalls of using asymptotically uncorrected standardized
PFSs such as lz and ECI4z because prior studies have found
greater benefits from correction under IRT models more
complex than the Rasch (Sinharay, 2016a; Snijders, 2001).
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